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1. Why were you initially drawn to theorizing about action and agency? 
 
I had been introduced to the domain by John Searle’s seminar on the philosophy of 
action, whose contents inspired his 1983 book entitled Intentionality. John is an impressive 
lecturer and on-line thinker; his seminar was, in two respects, deeply innovative.  First, John 
claimed that action itself (rather than the beliefs and desires that might contribute to causing 
it) has a general structure common to all the Intentional states. Second, he introduced the 
famous notion of an intention-in-action, thus allowing to analyze as intentional all the 
spontaneous, embodied ways in which actions are performed. The combination of these two 
remarkable features of Searle’s theory opened up brand new ways of thinking about embodied 
intentions, and would prove very useful for describing psychological and neurological 
evidence. My personal involvement in the philosophy of action, however, did not emerge 
until ten years later, when I set out to explore schizophrenic perturbations of agency 
awareness. 
At the beginning of the nineties, I was conducting research on such general 
philosophical topics as intentionality, consciousness and concept acquisition, as a member of 
an interdisciplinary CNRS unit, CREA, where rich interactions between philosophers of mind 
and language, logicians, anthropologists, experimental psychologists, and psychiatrists were a 
regular feature. Given my interest in consciousness, I engaged in a collaborative research 
project with a French psychiatrist, Dr. Henri Grivois, a specialist in the early episodes of 
psychosis. According to him, patients generally have, at the onset of their illness, a sudden 
impression of enjoying a deeply felt, reciprocal bond with others, which Grivois named 
“concernment”. Subjects seem to think that people (and objects) convey messages to or about 
themselves. After a few hours or days, patients come to believe that they have a specific role 
to play in the community, or even in the world at large – thus arriving at an experience of 
“centrality”. The second group of features in Grivois’ clinical description relates to a 
perturbed agency. Patients have the impression that others are all doing the same thing, and 
are mainly imitating them; they however are the ones who imitate others - either in gestures 
(echopraxia) or in words (echolalia). They also frequently emulate others’ goals. These two 
group of features, concernment and mimetic behaviors, Grivois  speculated, are functionally 
related. Patients might feel concernment and centrality because of their mimetic disposition. 
As a philosopher interested in consciousness, I found that Grivois’ theory was quite 
intriguing. It helped one to approach consciousness from a fresh perspective, based on the 
direct functional requirements of agency. Dan Dennett, in his Consciousness Explained, 
defends a ‘Multiple Drafts model’ of  consciousness that also tries to assimilate scientific 
evidence. On his view, information entering the nervous system in a massively parallel way, 
is locally ‘edited’ by the brain, with different quasi-narratives emerging at different time 
scales. Dan was then mainly interested in visual perception and memory; an efficient general 
rebuttal of the ‘Cartesian theater’ view of consciousness, his model does not say much about 
the specific roles of conscious states in action. In a footnote (p.112), however, Dennett briefly 
reports a 1963 experiment by T.I. Nielsen having to do with agency awareness. A subject is 
tricked into believing that he is looking at his own gloved hand when drawing a figure : the 
perceptual ‘reafference’ for his action – what he actually looks at - is sometimes his, 
sometimes a hand that performs a different movement. Placed in this condition, a subject who 
is visually monitoring his drawing hand feels it being pulled in the direction of the observed 
movement each time the observed movement conflicts with his actual performance. In 
Dennett’s terms, this particular brain ‘editing’  or ‘inference’ solves a conflict between vision 
and proprioception of one’s actions. How can an inference be experienced as a pull? 
The parallel of this case with the feeling of ‘concernment’ of Grivois’ patients in their 
first psychotic episode is striking. In both cases, subjects have a proprioceptive feeling ‘telling 
them’ that something has interfered with their will. In both cases, some kind of conflict is 
involved between what the subjects predict and what they observe about the consequences of 
their acting. Grivois’observations contained the seeds of a view, developed since then, that a 
non-matching comparator might trigger the psychotic sense of extraneity – of a foreign 
interference - for one’s actions and thoughts. An important difference between the two cases, 
however, is the following: where Nielsen’s subjects felt a strong pull to the direction of the 
(seen) movement, patients with psychosis would feel a diminished sense of agency for their 
own actions. Where Nielsen’s subjects were exposed to an occurrent (accurate) non-matching 
signal thanks to a functional comparator, patients were exposed either to a permanent 
(inaccurate) non-matching signal, or to no signal at all, because of a faulty comparator. 
 This parallel, among other considerations, motivated us to start testing experimentally 
the ‘motor’ hypothesis in patients with schizophrenic delusions, with the collaboration of 
Marc Jeannerod, a neuroscientist of action. If we put a deluded patient in an experimental 
situation such as Nielsen’s, will he be able to tell whether the currently observed hand is his 
own? We predicted that patients should be impaired, relative to non-deluded patients and 
normal controls, in recognizing their own actions. Our predictions turned out to be correct 
(Daprati et al., 1997). Similar conclusions were reached by Chris Frith and his colleagues, 
using different experimental paradigms and stimuli. Now, the important question is: what 
philosophical benefit can be drawn from this empirical research?  
 
 
2. What do you consider to be your own most important contribution(s) to theorizing 
about action and agency, and why? 
 
The most direct effect of interdisciplinary influences on my philosophical work was to 
press me into articulating a metaphysics of action that could reflect the functional aspects that 
psychologists and neuroscientists have been uncovering. Part of what clinical evidence taught 
us was that the senses of bodily and of mental agency are simultaneously perturbed in deluded 
subjects: their actions seem to them to be externally controlled, and their thoughts to be 
inserted. This suggests that an adequate theory of action should apply  to both object- and 
self-directed kinds of action. Clearly, action is a dynamic phenomenon through which an 
agent uses representations to control her physical and social environments or her own thought 
processes. To reflect this dynamic property of actions, a proper definition needs to express the 
teleological structure of the causal-representational process through which a particular goal 
(and a trajectory to reach it) is selected among a range of actions in the agent’s repertoire. 
How are we to accommodate these various functional requirements in defining  an 
empirically sound concept of action?  
 
A first revision is now well-accepted. Beliefs, desires and intentions, with a 
propositional content, as ordinarily conceived, do not deal easily with the specific ways 
chosen to perform an action. Granting that agents have preferential ways to produce 
outcomes, intentions in action must be able to have nonconceptual, that is, protopropositional 
kinds of content. These contents specify the spatial and temporal dynamics, rhythm, 
proprioceptive markers, and other phenomenological properties that have to be present for the 
action to be successful (Proust, 2003). Given that these nonconceptual contents drive motor 
activity, they are usually called “motor representations” - a term used by neuroscientists to 
refer to neural activations in the motor area. Motor representations, however, only apply to 
bodily action. When applied to thought processes, other types of nonconceptual content, with 
their own dynamic features, are used to select and monitor mental actions; these ‘epistemic 
feelings’ are particularly interesting to study, as they form a primary basis for self-knowledge. 
(Proust, 2007, 2008). A second step was to examine the requirements for the representation of 
an intention to acquire executive force. Not every candidate intention to act is executed; 
intentions can also be simulated, evaluated and abandoned. How should one distinguish the 
executive from the simply motivational and epistemic activity evoked by an intention to act? 
A volitional definition of action was developed in Proust (2005) to spell out this difference.  
This definition has a teleological structure, which in the case of action is roughly 
expressed by the law of action-effect: Actions are behaviors that tend to be executed in a 
context, and they tend to be executed in this context because they have had a beneficial effect 
for the agent in this context. Behaviors that have had detrimental consequences in this context 
tend not to be reproduced. This general teleogical structure needs to be complemented, 
however, in order  to 1) express the dispositional range of accessible actions for an agent at t; 
2) explain why unsuccessful or inadequately targeted actions may occur;   and 3) explain how 
action patterns can, on a particular occasion, be adjusted and modified to respond to the 
constraints of a new context. The mathematics of adaptive control systems is helpful in 
satisfying these requirements with full generality. Regulation laws state which outcomes are 
associated with specific commands in specific contexts. Feedback laws state which portion of 
the regulation space is accessible at a given time to an organism with a given learning history. 
Regulation and feedback laws have been shown to necessarily involve representations of the 
action space (Proust, 2006a). It is indeed a theorem of control theory that the best regulator of 
a system is one which is a model of that system. In an optimal control system, in other words,  
the regulator's actions are, as Conant and Ashby write, "merely the system's actions as seen 
through a specific mapping".1 In other words, any regulation involves a prior simulation. 
Action needs to be accounted for in a way that combines such dynamical and representational 
properties. The concept of volition to act, which I articulated in 2005, attempted to provide 
such an account. A volition is a dynamic executive event, that decomposes into the following 
three interconnected properties: 
                                                
1 Conant & Ashby, 1970 
1) A regulation space is available to the agent at the relevant time, t, in which there is 
at least one trajectory that leads from the current position to a target; 
2)  There is a salient target at t;  
3) A prevailing reward associated with the salient target selects and activates a 
suitable command at t. 
Note that these three conditions correspond respectively to procedural-epistemic, 
contextual and motivational conditions. They have to apply jointly for a volition to occur 
(they are necessary and sufficient conditions for a representation of the goal to be endowed 
with executive force). On this view, a volition does not constitute a self-contained mental 
action that would prepare bodily action. A volition to bring about G is the representational-
executive contribution that normally generates the effects typical of G (whether mental or 
bodily).  Note also that volitions for bodily as well as for mental actions are made accessible 
by the system’s prior history. As in any teleogical-etiological definition, such history explains 
why volitions exist, and how the parameters involved in the three conditions are properly 
calibrated, or, in certain biased cases, distorted. The particular history profile of an agent is 
thus able to explain how she can mistakenly represent that a certain kind of control will bring 
about a given outcome. 
In a (non-dynamic) semantic analysis of volition, a volition is defined as an effort to 
bring about some change in virtue of this effort. One of the benefits of articulating the control 
structure above is that the reflexivity of volitions, intentions, and reasons to act can now be 
understood as an architectural feature derived from the control structure. As we have seen, 
control systems are essentially causal-representational loops. In each loop, a given command 
causally determines, in virtue of its content, a corresponding episode of monitoring, which in 
turn triggers, in virtue of its content, a new command: reinforcing the former command, or 
prompting revisions to it. The property of mutual causal influence between these two 
complementary levels is called “causal contiguity”. (Mellor, 1991) Now, an important 
semantic fact is that any causally contiguous representational structure necessarily generates 
both representational promiscuity and a basic, nonconceptual form of reflexivity. (Proust, 
2007). 
 There is representational promiscuity because command and monitoring need to 
compare observed feedback with expected feedback; they need to have a common 
representation of the goal, and of the route that leads to it.  There is reflexivity because 
monitoring always refers to the specific command that prompts it. Both representational 
promiscuity and reflexivity have been noticed by classical analyses of action. If you intend to 
act, your intention also constitutes the satisfaction condition of the completed action: this 
representational promiscuity indeed depends on the causal/semantic relationship between a 
command and a monitoring episodes. They only differ in that the first states what is to be 
obtained, while the second reports on what does/does not obtain (a difference in direction of 
fit,2 with the same basic content).  In every cognitive control structure, representational 
promiscuity must be present. Monitoring evaluates the execution of the command, while the 
command directs or organizes upcoming monitoring. In contrast with beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, volitions thus involve two directions of fit, based on the same representational 
schema (as suggested by the idea of comparing what you have with what you want). 
Let us now examine how volitions to act have reflexivity as a consequence of 
representational promiscuity. Reflexivity is necessarily generated in a causally contiguous 
representational loop for two reasons. Resulting as it does from a causally contiguous 
command episode, every monitoring episode carries information about the previous 
command that caused it. Furthermore, some representational element in monitoring must have 
the function of carrying this information. It is crucial indeed that the command level identifies 
the ouput of a monitoring episode as a response to its own query, which requires in turn that 
the content of monitoring is structured by the command that causes it. The representational 
element having the function of a de se marker, however, does not need to involve a self-
concept. (Proust, 2003). This result will not be surprising to those philosophers who, like John 
Perry, claim that “basic self-knowledge is intrinsically selfless” (1986, 2000). As Perry has 
shown, it is possible to have information concerning something without representing it 
explicitly in the thought content. In that case, reflexivity is mentally by an “unarticulated” 
constituent. Recanati (2007) argues that cases of identification-free reflexivity (those that are 
immune to error of identification) depend on the mode of thinking (like perceiving or 
intending) rather than on the content of thought. On my own view, the “reflexive” modes are 
those that involve causal contiguity between two representational events: a (context-sensitive) 
command episode and a (circumstance-sensitive) evaluation episode (i.e. monitoring).   
 
Obviously, these philosophical observations are relevant to understanding the 
schizophrenic delusions described above. Adopting a control view of action in fact allows us 
                                                
2 A belief is true when it fits the world : it has a mind-to-world direction of fit. Reciprocally, a desire, an 
intention or a volition are satisfied if the world adjusts to them : they have a world-to-mind direction of fit. See 
Austin, 1962. 
to adopt a new perspective both on agency and on agency awareness.  Recently, philosophers 
have tried to explain the asymmetry between a preserved sense of ownership (of bodily 
experience) and a perturbed sense of agency in patients with schizophrenic delusions of 
control. On the present view, there are as many forms of reflexivity and possible disturbances 
as there are control loops. Functional considerations suggest that there are at least four such 
levels, which are respectively motor (intentions in action/volitions to move), self-world (prior 
intention/volition to obtain that P- a given change in the world), self-self  (prior 
intention/volition to obtain a mental property by affecting oneself), and self-other regulations 
(prior intention/volition to obtain that P in virtue of our common effort). Abnormal 
phenomenology results from reflexive blindness generated in one or the other of these loops. 
Reflexive blindness, however, belongs to monitoring, rather than control. It does not affect to 
the same degree the capacity to act. I tried to explain this interesting dissociation in 
schizophrenia in Proust (2006b). 
 
3. What other sub-disciplines in philosophy and non-philosophical disciplines stand 
to benefit the most from philosophical work on the nature of action and agency, and 
how might such engagement be accomplished?  
To understand how an empirically adequate conception of action can gain higher 
relevance to other fields, one obviously needs to have some idea of the features of the 
philosophical theory that will fulfill this promise. As I have said above, my own view is 
that the most empirically adequate way of capturing the conceptual structure of action is 
to see it as the most accomplished form of adaptive control to date. Adaptive control is 
itself an adaptation whose vehicle is constituted by embodied neural systems. The kind of 
adaptive control a being possesses determines, by and large, the framework within which 
his/her perception, emotion and memory will play their respective roles. If one adopts this 
view, the four most directly affected fields are, in science, mathematics, evolutionary 
biology,  and the cognitive sciences (including cognitive psychopathology), and, in 
philosophy, epistemology.  
 Why mathematics? Mathematics is close to philosophy in that it aims to capture 
necessary relations between propositions. Dynamic system theories, such as the viability 
theory, starting from the hypothesis that dynamic systems are associated with changing 
environments, allow us to understand and describe the constraints to which agency needs 
to respond. In particular, viability theory, (Aubin, 1991) allows the modeling of rational 
decisions in uncertain contexts in a way that radically minimizes the number of 
parameters that need to be represented for a preference to emerge. If the metaphysical 
assumption that agents are a subclass of adaptive control systems is correct, 
mathematicians,  philosophers and cognitive psychologists will have to work together in 
order to come up with specific classes of control models of action that meet the crucial 
constraint of parametric reduction.  
Evolutionary Biology studies the interaction between evolutionary history, 
adaptations, and selection pressures, and, in particular, the evolution of mental capacities 
across phylogenetic trees. It can be fertilized by  philosophical work on agency, as is 
shown by the impact on the field of Sterelny’s (2003) book. Much more needs to be done, 
however, to grasp the evolution of forms of action in non-human animals and  the role 
which the linguistic expression of goals and values can play in controlled agency.  
The Cognitive Sciences, and in particular Cognitive Psychopathology and 
Neuropsychology, have already drawn inspiration from the philosophy of action, by using, 
sometimes uncritically, concepts able to describe behavioral evidence (for example, the 
notion of an intention-in-action has been widely used by neuroscientists.) We have seen, 
furthermore, how philosophy and psychiatry have influenced each other in determining 
the dimensions of self-awareness involved in agency, and worked jointly with cognitive 
scientists on accounts of psychiatric disorders.   
Epistemology, however, strikes me as the philosophical subdomain that has the most 
to gain from current research on mental agency. In order to fully understand the concept 
of entitlement or prima facie justification, in which a subject feels entitled to form a belief 
without being able to explicitly articulate the reasons that he has to form that belief or the 
norm that he is applying, one needs to explain philosophically how this implicit 
knowledge has been formed and what content it has. Current work on mental action, and, 
in particular, on the control structure that it involves (in metacognitive judgments such as: 
I need to stop/pursue this line of reasoning, or in an attempt to retrieve an item from 
memory) is able to shed light on this issue. (Proust, 2008) 
 
4. What do you regard as the most neglected issues in contemporary work on action and 
agency that deserve more attention? 
Relying as they mostly do on folk-psychological intuitions, analytic philosophers tend to 
conflate two dimensions of agency: the motivational and the executive.  Distinguishing 
volition from  intention, is meant to provide the required distinction : you can desire A, know 
how to get A by doing P, intend to do P to get  A, while failing to attempt to do P. 
Conversely, you may execute P without having a reason, or a motivation to do so. As 
psychologists such as Theodule Ribot have shown us, there can be neuropsychological 
disturbances of volition that do not affect motivation, and conversely (see the imitation 
syndrome, described in Lhermitte, 1986).  
A movement that is voluntarily performed feels distinctively “effortful”, and the effects 
of a willful movement have a distinctive temporal  signature as compared with effects 
passively observed (Haggard, 2003). Volition itself, however, has no specific 
phenomenology; Malebranche correctly stressed that agents start moving their body (or 
mentally focusing, in mental action) to attain their goals, without knowing how they do it. My 
own account as summarized above  only offers a teleological explanation for the switch from 
‘epistemic-motivational’ to ‘active’; this type of definition identifies a selected function 
without offering a detailed metaphysical solution. The puzzle that a teleological explanation 
solves is that agents cannot be said to voluntarily switch into the active condition. In some 
sense, willing is something that happens to you, which does not mean that you cannot select 
from among desires those that you want to influence your future willing episodes. It strikes 
me, however, that the issue deserves to be dealt with in more detail, by studying the properties 
of dynamic systems, or otherwise. 
  
5. What are the most important open problems in philosophical theorizing about action 
and agency, and what are the prospects for progress? 
Philosophers enjoy doing mostly what they know how to do; as a result, agency has up 
to now mainly been studied  in philosophy through attitudes and their propositional contents. 
The domain of emotion, however, has proved difficult to approach in these terms; similarly, 
the domain of action resists a simple belief-desire analysis. In spite of these well-known 
problems, most analytic philosophers stick to their guns. Why should they have to understand 
brain activity to theorize about agency, or about consciousness? The less science, the more 
philosophy (the saying goes)! Is not a proper distinction between a personal level (what I feel 
and can report about my states of awareness) and subpersonal levels (what happens in my 
brain that causally explains how I feel, report, and do things) able to justify us in not 
bothering to collect scientific evidence?  
The problem with this general strategy is that the distinction that it presupposes is 
highly variable, self-interpretive and theory-laden. As Dennett took pains to show, the limit 
between subpersonal and personal facts may change with time scales, attentional demands 
and health. There is no firm ground in the personal that is not constrained by a myriad of 
subpersonal representations, which philosophers cannot afford to entirely ignore, in particular 
if they recognize the existence of nonconceptual forms of mental content. The mental cannot 
reside in a supposedly ‘final’ narrative layer, as articulated in language. It seems difficult, in 
short, to deny that neuroscience, experimental psychology, neuropsychology and cognitive 
psychopathology deliver facts and evidence that any conceptual view of consciousness or 
agency needs to take into account if it is to be empirically adequate. 
This does not mean, however, that philosophers need to summarize endless facts about 
the way the brain sends action commands and monitors them. What is rather needed, is 
serious conceptual work to grasp the dynamic properties of agentive systems, and to come up 
with views on how these possibly non-conceptual representations might be conditions of 
action selection and recognition. On my view, the prospects for philosophical progress on this 
issue presently call for the collaborative insights of mathematicians and computer scientists, 
on the one hand, and philosophers and psychologists, on the other hand. 
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